Bringing Home the Crisis: How US Evening News Framed the 2011 Japan Nuclear Crisis by Iannarino, Nicholas T. et al.
Bringing Home the Crisis: How
US Evening News Framed the
2011 Japan Nuclear Crisis
Nicholas T. Iannarino*, Shari R. Veil** and
Alfred J. Cotton III***
*Department of Language, Culture, and Communication, University of Michigan-Dearborn, 3036 CASL
Building, 4901 Evergreen Road, Dearborn, MI 48128. E-mail: iannarnt@umich.edu
**Risk Sciences Division, College of Communication and Information, University of Kentucky, 235 Grehan
Building, Lexington, KY 40506-0224. E-mail: shari.veil@uky.edu
***College of Communication and Information, University of Kentucky, 308 Lucille Little Library, Lexington,
KY 40506-0224. E-mail: alfred.cotton@uky.edu
Crisis communication scholars have used framing theory to argue that how the media
characterizes varying aspects of a crisis can influence the public’s perception of the event.
While much of the crisis-framing research has been content analysis-driven, providing
numbers and percentages of news stories that fit a certain story type, it is also important
to examine how shifts in public opinion and policy may be indicative of and influenced by
the ongoing discourse that news outlets use to characterize international crises. In this
study,we use inductive analysis to describe the frames used by US evening network news
to characterize the 2011 Japan nuclear crisis and outline how this coverage may have
shaped and reflected public opinion and policy in the US during and following the crisis.
1. Introduction
Crisis is defined as a ‘sense of threat, urgency, anddestruction, often on a monumental scale’ (Seeger,
Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, 4). For communities directly
affected by a large-scale crisis, the effects can reverber-
ate for years or even decades as the public struggles to
make sense of the crisis, address the lingering risks
caused by the event and adapt to the new normal of life
after the incident. Recently, however, technological
advances allowing for increased media access and dis-
semination have augmented the immediate and far-
reaching effects of a crisis.Within minutes of a major
disaster, media channels broadcast images and begin
framing various aspects of the crisis in their coverage to
make the incident salient to audiences. Regardless of
their physical proximity, individuals in the community
and around the globe can now experience the cognitive
and emotional effects of witnessing an incident as it
unfolds in the media.
Media are considered the ‘most important informa-
tion path’ during a crisis event (Larsson, 2010, 716).
Despite the growing popularity of social media as a
forum for crisis communication, media consumers are
more likely to share crisis information from traditional
media sources because of its higher perceived credibil-
ity (Utz, Schultz, & Glocka, 2013).Television, specifically,
is the most common medium used in times of risk and
crisis because of its ability to deliver immediate infor-
mation with visual aids (Heath & O’Hair, 2009).While
the Internet is now the second most popular news
platform, with 39% of Americans receiving their news
online, television remains the most widely used
news medium, with 55% of Americans turning to televi-
sion as their source of information (Pew Research
Center, 2012).Therefore, it is important to explore how
television news coverage can play a prominent role in
explaining crisis events to make them more meaningful
for audiences, especially when those events are
complex or happen on the other side of the world.
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Crisis communication scholars have used framing
theory to argue that how the media characterizes
varying aspects of a crisis can influence the public’s
perception of the event (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013).
Several news frames, or core aspects of a story that are
selected and advanced by the media to characterize and
make sense of an event, have been previously identified
as occurring commonly in US news coverage (An &
Gower, 2009; Houston, Pfefferbaum, & Rosenholtz,
2012). For example, across 11 US natural disasters
between 2000 and 2010, five primary frames character-
ized national news coverage. These were labelled envi-
ronment,human interest and economic,which involved the
natural, emotional and financial consequences of the
crisis respectively; political, which addressed the actions
of government leaders and their policies; and criminal,
which involved crisis-related legal incidents and investi-
gations (Houston et al., 2012). An et al. (2009) also
examined national news coverage of organizational
crises and found that prominent frames included attri-
bution of responsibility, which held either an individual or
an organization accountable for the crisis’s cause or
solution; conflict, which reflected disagreement among
individuals or organizations following the incident; and
morality, which considered the event and the behaviour
of those responsible for the crisis through an ethical
lens.These frames have largely been identified through
content analysis-driven studies, which indicate what
types of stories are covered by the media. However,
knowing that a certain percentage of news coverage is
devoted to particular frames does little to explain how
the content of these stories could influence how audi-
ences make sense of a crisis as part of a larger social
discourse.
Specific to this study, Gamson and Modigliani (1989)
identified seven frames used in US media discourse to
characterize issues related to nuclear power. However,
they also argued that this ongoing coverage both
reflected and shaped public opinion of nuclear energy
during that time. In the 1950s, TV network news and
other media framed nuclear power as a necessary and
inevitable tool for human progress because of its poten-
tial to create economic growth and peace around the
world.Progress remained unopposed in media and public
discourse until the 1970s, when a widespread energy
crisis resulted in a second major pronuclear frame:
achieving energy independence in the United States.
Increased proliferation of nuclear weapons and growing
public concern about the safety of nuclear reactors led
to the introduction of public accountability frames, which
characterized nuclear corporations as prioritizing their
own interests above public safety and transparency.
Frames also indicated resignation to the runaway nature
of nuclear power, a technological monster that humans
have created and cannot stop, a ‘time bomb waiting to
explode’.Two other frames, soft paths, or environmental
alternatives to nuclear energy, and the cost ineffective-
ness of nuclear power were identified but not promi-
nent in media discourse (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).
Clear anti-nuclear frames were rare in the national
media until the nuclear crises at Three Mile Island and
Chernobyl, which accelerated a shift from progress to
runaway as the most prominent frame. Fear surrounding
the delayed and invisible effects of radiation and a belief
that nuclear officials were overestimating their ability to
manage the crises comprised the media’s fatalistic
frame of nuclear power as an out-of-control technology
that would inevitably cause future US crises. Public
accountability was also prominent in framing the nuclear
industry as generally incompetent and deceptive in mis-
leading the public to protect their image. Additionally,
a new frame called devil’s bargain emerged as progress
and runaway frames began occurring sequentially to
produce ambivalence towards nuclear energy.Through
survey research, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) found
that this media discourse, particularly the lack of a clear
progress frame following Chernobyl, contributed to and
reflected the public’s widespread ambivalence towards
nuclear power. During peak media coverage of nuclear
energy issues, for example, public support for the indus-
try dipped, only to return to previous levels as the
media shifted their focus to another topic (Gamson &
Modigliani,1989).Thus,people who closely follow media
and governmental discourse are likely to develop per-
ceptions consistent with the most prominent frames
(Lim & Seo, 2009).
In this study, we use inductive analysis to describe
how news media contribute to ongoing discourse about
nuclear power through the framing of a recent nuclear
disaster.We also question how the characterization of
this incident may have influenced and reflected changes
in media consumers’ perceptions and public policy fol-
lowing the crisis. First,we provide an overview of crisis-
framing literature and describe the process of data
collection and analysis.We then describe the prominent
frames that characterized US broadcast evening news
coverage of the 2011 Japan nuclear crisis. Finally, we
discuss the implications for how these frames may have
shaped and reflected public opinion and policy based on
crisis-framing theory.
2. News framing theory in crises
During international crisis events, media and govern-
ment discourse and public opinion interact with one
another as parallel systems, influencing and reflecting
one another to produce meaning over time (Lim et al.,
2009). During the coverage of complex and interna-
tional crises, news media actively aid audiences in inter-
preting larger discourse by defining the meaning, value
and causes of events; connecting incidents as they
unfold; and offering moral judgments in a way that
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demonstrates their perspective (Entman, 1993;
Littlefield & Quenette, 2007; Ryan, Carragee, &
Meinhofer, 2001). Media frames, which comprise the
core of interpretive news packages (Gamson &
Modigliani, 1989), give meaning to events, eliciting
behavioural, cognitive, and affective responses from
audiences (Van Gorp, 2007). The media’s ‘selection,
emphasis, and exclusion’ (Ryan et al., 2001, 176) of the
symbolic devices that characterize news discourse con-
stitutes framing’s function as ‘a central organizing idea
for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what
is at issue’ (Gamson, 1989, 157).
Because media are often considered the clearest
indicator of the general issue culture (Gamson &
Modigliani, 1989), the ways in which news frames crisis
events provide an essential context for interpreting the
public’s perceptions of the incidents and their ramifica-
tions (Miller & Riechert, 2001). Walters and Hornig
(1993, 220) even argued that news helps determine
‘how people cope with and behave in a world in crisis’.
When audiences focus on the cues provided by the
media to construct their own perceptions, attitudes,
judgments, knowledge and behaviours about disaster
events, issues and the individuals involved, a crisis-framing
effect occurs (Coombs & Holladay, 2010).
2.1. Frame competition in crisis management
Following a crisis, status-quo players and change advo-
cates appear in the mass media to engage in ‘framing
contests’ (Seeger et al., 2003), where actors’ interpre-
tations of the event and visions of future policies
compete for public and political support (Boin, Hart, &
McConnell, 2009). For example, international crises
often raise conflicting interpretations domestically
regarding the likelihood that similar events may occur,
how prepared organizations are to deal with these
crises, and options for reducing potential risks
(Zoeteman, Kersten, Vos, van de Voort, & Ale, 2010).
Contestants may also characterize the crisis as an
unfortunate and uncontrollable incident, where well-
meaning policy-makers should be absolved and existing
policies left intact, or as an opportunity to assign blame
to existing policies, individuals or organizations for
failing to prevent a foreseeable and controllable calam-
ity (Boin et al., 2009). During coverage of Hurricane
Katrina, for example, instead of focusing on the hurri-
cane as the cause of the crisis, newspapers directed the
public to assign blame and responsibility to authorities
for their ineffective crisis response (Littlefield et al.,
2007).When individuals or organizations are blamed for
the crisis, they must choose to reject, deflect, diffuse or
accept responsibility for the incident to attempt to
avoid negative political consequences (Boin et al., 2009).
However, if a crisis is widely believed to be preventable,
if the actors have been in power for a long time, and if
those responsible have not gained a wealth of credibility
or good press before the crisis, oppositional forces will
likely be more successful in gaining public and political
support in framing contests (Boin et al., 2009).
Additionally, media coverage is only likely to support
crisis managers’ frames if their communication is per-
ceived as credible (Masters & Hart, 2012).When a crisis
occurs, the public expects actors to quickly and persua-
sively answer questions about how severe the situation
is, how it occurred, who or what is to be held respon-
sible, and what needs to be done to alleviate it (Boin
et al., 2009). Conversely, if actors were insufficiently
transparent or purposely withheld information before
or at the start of a crisis, additional waves of negative
media attention and decreased trust in authorities will
likely occur (Zoeteman et al., 2010). For example, after
China refused to cooperate with the international com-
munity in managing the 2003 severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) crisis,Western news sources began
contradicting statements made by Chinese officials with
those of the World Health Organization (Buus &
Olsson, 2006).
Despite an organization’s attempts to frame their
crisis response favourably, news frames can heavily influ-
ence public opinion about crisis actors’ performance
and external image (Strömbäck & Nord, 2006). In an
experimental framing effects study, news frames that
evoked anger towards an organization’s intentional
wrongdoing caused audiences to process less informa-
tion and to possess more negative attitudes towards
those responsible (Kim & Cameron, 2011). Placing an
emphasis on an organization’s intentionality, immorality
and unethical behaviour in causing a crisis affects
audiences’ moral judgment and thus elicits more blame
(An, 2011). Likewise, when the Tokyo Electric Power
Company (TEPCO) was framed in traditional and social
media as being responsible for the 2011 Japan nuclear
crisis, audiences were more likely to experience anger
towards TEPCO and share more negative messages
about the company’s diminished reputation than when
they were framed as victims of the crisis (Utz et al.,
2013). However, stories that employ human interest
frames, demonstrate sadness for crisis victims, or hold
an organization responsible for a crisis instead of an
individual can result in increased audience empathy
(Cho & Gower, 2006), increased message processing
(Kim et al., 2011), and less anger and blame (An, 2011).
2.2. News production rituals
In addition to producing meaning, journalists are con-
sumers of the same media output that is framed for the
public (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). During crisis cov-
erage, journalists must first decide what constitutes a
crisis event and what role they will play in its coverage.
Media managers define calamity events as surprising
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incidents that demand a quick response and swift deci-
sion making and that have the capacity to challenge
organizational values and routines for covering similar
events in the future (Olsson, 2010). For example, inter-
national nuclear disasters often gain intense media
attention because they are typically unexpected and
their magnitude can usually be felt around the world
(Zoeteman et al., 2010). Media managers believe their
role in crisis coverage transcends simple information
dissemination by also attempting to fulfil the therapeu-
tic ritual of providing their audience with immediacy,
comfort, reassurance and understanding of the event
(Riegert & Olsson, 2007).
During crises when events change rapidly, news
frames are typically dynamic rather than static (Li, 2007).
These frames must shift in accordance with the audi-
ence’s understanding of the event as it evolves in order
for the media to remain relevant in the historical drama
(Olsson, 2010; Riegert et al., 2007). When a story’s
temporal and spatial frames are intermittently shifted,
the crisis event’s salience in the news and among the
public is increased (Muschert & Carr, 2006). Addition-
ally, crises that are unanticipated and generate risk
usually cause uncertainty, which audiences attempt to
reduce at the start of the incident by seeking media
information to gain a better understanding of the event
(Spence, Westerman, Skalski, Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer,
2006).As such, fluctuating frames initially function as a
source for information, clarification and uncertainty
reduction; later as a tool for immediate sensemaking;
and finally as an outlet for understanding long-term
implications (Li, 2007). Journalists must also select their
sources in crisis coverage to determine ‘not only who
will be heard, but also what will be heard’. For example,
‘Witnesses, experts, victims, spokespersons, and officials
are integral components of the newsgathering process
in a disaster setting’ (Walters et al., 1993, 221).When
‘expert’ voices are marginalized by journalists who
emphasize the role of lay parties, the dissemination of
accurate information about the scientific and technical
aspects of a crisis does not occur, which may lead to
public confusion about the disaster and its aftermath
(Cohen, Vijaykumar, Wray, & Karamehic-Muratovic,
2008; Walters et al., 1993).
2.3. Culturally discrepant news framing
Media frames become the building blocks of culture
and reality because they are ‘socially shared and per-
sistent over time [and] work symbolically to meaning-
fully structure the social world’ (Reese, 2001, 11)’.
Despite the current belief that we ‘live in a global
information age with media systems that transcend
national borders’, a media outlet’s country of origin
may cause ‘different aspects or attributes of the same
issue’ to be presented through different frames (Luther
& Zhou, 2005; Tian & Stewart, 2005, 299). In fact, the
same event may be understood differently by interna-
tional audiences depending on the frames used to
define it (Tian et al., 2005). Culturally discrepant news
framing reflects different nations’ divergent media
values and roles, larger cultural themes, economic
interests, political contexts and current relationships
with the nations affected by the crisis (Feng, Brewer, &
Ley, 2012). For example, although coverage of the SARS
outbreaks (Luther et al., 2005) and the 2008 Chinese
baby formula recall (Feng et al., 2012) by major
Western and Chinese newspapers emphasized many of
the same frames, Western news criticized Chinese
systems for failing to manage the crises to a greater
degree than the Chinese news, which focused more on
positive initiatives undertaken by leaders. How domes-
tic news characterizes crises in other parts of the
world can be particularly important because these inci-
dents are not directly experienced and limited infor-
mation is available from other sources.
3. Crisis context
To analyse how the news framed a recent nuclear crisis,
we looked at the specific context of a disaster that
occurred on 11 March 2011 when an 8.9-magnitude
earthquake hit the east coast of Japan, generating a 30-ft
wall of water that swept away homes, buildings, cars and
thousands of lives (CNN, 2011a). The earthquake and
tsunami also triggered meltdowns of three reactors at
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, releasing
radioactive material into the air and ocean (CNN,
2011b). In the United States, live news broadcasts broke
into regular programming to report on the cascading
crisis events. During the weeks that followed, news
agencies continued to follow the storyline as both the
death toll and radiation levels rose.
In this study, we specifically examine the nuclear
aspect of the crisis because, while triggered by a series
of natural disasters, the nuclear concerns increased the
crisis impact and added considerations of organizational
responsibility, which altered the expectations of the
crisis response. Like Gamson and Modigliani (1989), we
are not arguing that changes in media discourse cause
direct changes in public opinion, but rather we are
attempting to understand the shift in US public opinion
and policy regarding the 2011 Japanese nuclear crisis
within the context of ongoing media discourse related
to nuclear power.
4. Methods
The Digital Content Analysis (DCA) Lab, housed within
a college of communication at a south-eastern univer-
sity, perpetually records 20 US network and cable tel-
evision channels. The system provides video streams
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and programme transcripts of half-hour blocks of
broadcasted content for all digital captures, resulting in
480 hours of broadcast data each day. This content is
accessible through a search engine archive known as
COMMTV, which can be used to identify, track and
analyse specific media content related to news events.
We used this database to collect video artefacts and
transcripts between 11 March and 11 April 2011.
Because discussion began to taper in the US news
media around 4 weeks after the initial earthquake, these
dates best represent the initial and evolving concerns
over nuclear safety in Japan and the United States. Our
search terms paired ‘Japan’ and its syntactic variations
(e.g., ‘Japanese’, ‘Japan’s’, etc.) with ‘radiation’, ‘nuclear’,
‘contamination’ and ‘exposure’, and the syntactic varia-
tions of these terms.The database was primed only to
include transcripts where a pair of search terms
appeared within 200 words of one another, so as to
limit the occurrence of irrelevant content.
The DCA Lab stores video and transcripts from
seven network and 13 cable channels. For this analysis,
we narrowed our focus to US network broadcasts of
evening news content airing between 18.00 and 20.00
hours EST on ABC, CBS, NBC and PBS. Evening news
programmes on the ‘big three’ television networks
(i.e., ABC, CBS and NBC) average a combined 21.6
million viewers a night. US primetime cable news
coverage, meanwhile, attracts only 3.2 million viewers,
while morning network news programmes average
12.4 million (Guskin, Rosenstiel, & Moore, 2011).
Thus, we chose to analyse evening network news pro-
grammes based on their comparative average viewer-
ship, widespread proliferation, and status as a top
news platform in the United States (Pew Research
Center, 2012).
Our initial search revealed 96 videos and transcripts
of network evening news coverage. Three items were
omitted for not containing content relevant to the
Fukushima nuclear crisis and were only initially included
as a result of arbitrary word combinations.We were left
with 93 videos and transcripts representing 46.5 hours
of evening network news coverage.The distribution of
included programmes across the networks varied mod-
erately,with 29 videos and transcripts culled from NBC,
25 from PBS, 21 from ABC and 18 from CBS.
4.1. Coding process
Previous framing analyses of crisis events have been
conducted both inductively to determine what frames
emerged in the crisis coverage (Feng et al., 2012;
Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Joye, 2010; Littlefield et al.,
2007; Tian et al., 2005) and deductively using frames
that have occurred commonly in news coverage (An
et al., 2009; Li, 2007; Luther et al., 2005;Muschert et al.,
2006;Walters et al., 1993). In this study, we were inter-
ested in describing the central themes that were spe-
cific to US network evening news coverage of the 2011
Japan nuclear crisis and categorizing these themes into
the larger core frames that fundamentally characterized
this event.Thus, we conducted an inductive analysis of
evening network news transcripts using the constant
comparative method (Butler-Kisber, 2010).Two coders
individually analysed the data in its entirety to perform
open coding, searching inductively for as many com-
monalities that emerged from the data’s events, com-
mentary and actions (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Both
coders then met to discuss and refine the open codes
and place them into larger axial categories, collapsing,
comparing and integrating them around specific points
of intersection until we identified the 14 themes that
best captured the variation in the data set.Two of the
authors then individually applied the 14 themes to 20%
(19 transcripts) of the sample by randomly selecting
every fifth transcript to deductively gauge the consist-
ency and trustworthiness of the themes with the data
set and the two coders’ interpretations.After another
group discussion, the remaining transcripts were coded
separately;Coder 1 analysed 38 transcripts and coder 2
analysed 36. After coding all 93 transcripts, the group
reached consensus that the thematic categories were
saturated and thus could not be broken down or added
to any further (Butler-Kisber, 2010). The coders then
conducted a final read of the transcripts to group the
14 emergent themes into the four larger core frames
that best characterized the crisis coverage (Strauss
et al., 1998).
In keeping with other exemplar inductive analyses
(e.g., Buus et al., 2006; Harry, Sturgis, & Klingner, 2005),
we did not calculate an intercoder reliability score
(Neuendorf, 2002). Instead,we relied on multiple inten-
sive group discussions between each round of data
analysis to assess discrepancies, deal with conflicting
interpretations, clarify the appropriateness and consist-
ency of emergent themes, and reach consensus to
ensure that both coders remained consistent in their
analysis. Based on these discussions, we wrote brief
descriptions of the four frames and their themes to
best represent the coverage as it occurred. We also
selected events, commentary and actions from the cov-
erage to include in the findings that best represented
the four frames and their themes.
5. Findings
Analysis of the coverage resulted in four core frames
that characterized US network evening news discourse
of the crisis: (1) uncertainty and anxiety; (2) bringing it
home; (3) heroes and villains; and (4) cancer and con-
tamination. Later, we describe the four frames and their
central themes by citing specific examples from the
news broadcast coverage.
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5.1. Uncertainty and anxiety
This frame reflected the network news reporters’
attempts to create meaning of the unpredictable
nuclear crisis, speculate about the possible immediate
outcomes and recovery efforts at the damaged
Fukushima plant, and contextualize a complex situation
by drawing historical comparisons with previous
nuclear crises. This frame also characterized the
response of Japanese citizens to the nuclear crisis, par-
ticularly anxiety and isolation resulting from radiation
fears.Three central themes described this core frame:
(1) uncertain severity and desperation; (2) crisis com-
parisons; and (3) public anxiety and abandonment.
5.1.1. Uncertain severity and desperation
Speculation about the severity and danger of a ‘worst
case scenario’ varied at different points during the cov-
erage. The only frame that remained consistent
throughout the coverage of the immediate nuclear
crisis at Fukushima was that the narrative itself was
unpredictable.On 28 March,ABC observed,‘it certainly
seems the story shifts day by day’. Stories centred on
Fukushima workers’ ‘desperate attempts’ to cool the
reactor primarily through the infusion of water, and it
appeared that nearly every complication at Fukushima
could be averted if workers could pull off a last-second,
seemingly improbable and risky solution. Each strategy
was described as a ‘drastic step’, a ‘last-ditch effort’ or
the ‘last big gamble’. Initial efforts to cool the reactors
were framed as impractical, improvised and desperate –
like ‘using a squirt gun to put out a forest fire’ (ABC, 17
March).The alternative – multiple nuclear meltdowns –
was believed to be so devastating that workers had no
choice but to continue.
5.1.2. Crisis comparisons
Network news reporters and expert guests attempted
to make sense of the complicated, science-heavy and
threatening situation at Fukushima through metaphori-
cal language.Coverage in this theme frequently assessed
the preliminary similarities and differences between the
Fukushima crisis and other well-known nuclear calami-
ties – Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and to a lesser
extent, Japan’s previous experience with widespread
radiation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of
WorldWar II.While experts on ABC believed the total
amount of radiation released could equal or surpass the
Chernobyl accident,NBC argued that such an outcome
was unlikely. CBS and NBC broadcasted packages
filmed in the radioactive ruins of Chernobyl, still deso-
late 25 years after the disaster. On 18 March, CBS
questioned whether the timetable of recovery or
inhabitability would rival that of Chernobyl: ‘From the
initial panic at Chernobyl to the lack of a permanent
solution 25 years later, a lesson in just how hard it is to
put the nuclear genie back in the bottle’.
5.1.3. Public anxiety and abandonment
Japanese citizens were generally characterized as being
tense about the crisis at Fukushima.This overall feeling
of uneasiness was a product of more specific senti-
ments of anxiety, frustration, uncertainty and scepti-
cism: ‘It is frightening. I look at my children and worry’
(CBS, 18 March). Network coverage also frequently
described the streets of Tokyo as deserted, largely
because of a growing exodus of Japanese citizens –
particularly precautious families with small children.On
16 March,CBS stated that theTokyo airports were filled
with a growing number of citizens attempting to take
flight. Contrasted with the desolate Tokyo rush hour
trains, the inter-city bullet trains were described as
‘absolutely packed . . . moving tens of thousands of
people to the south, where they think it’s safe’ (PBS, 17
March). Despite the mass departure, Tokyo was
reported to be running out of supplies:
We found stores running out of everything, a sign of
growing anxieties. [Tokyo resident]: ‘Nothing. No
water, no food, so I’m going back to my hometown’.
Other parts of this normally bustling city looked like
a ghost town. Fear and a shortage of gas are keeping
people off the streets (NBC, 16 March).
The situation did not improve later in the week. On
17 March, ABC reported that 140,000 people lived in
the 12–19-mile ring that surrounded the plant. Many of
them remained helpless: ‘Cut off from the outside
world, conditions are beginning to deteriorate’. The
search for survivors and collection of dead bodies
within the largely desolate containment zone was also
hampered.All four networks reported on 18 March that
over 100 elderly people were discovered abandoned in
a hospital six miles from the Fukushima complex, some
of them comatose. On 30 March, NBC described the
containment zone littered with lifeless bodies as ‘a
ghost town that [became] that much more unsettling’.
5.2. Bringing it home
In an attempt to localize coverage of the events at
Fukushima, news broadcasters characterized the crisis
as having the potential to affect the United States in a
number of ways. Themes included: (1) reassessing the
‘nuclear renaissance’; (2) calming radiation concerns;
and (3) Americans abroad.
5.2.1. Reassessing the ‘nuclear renaissance’
The most common theme within this frame focused
on the safety of the 104 nuclear reactors in the
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United States. This theme was present consistently
throughout the month of coverage. Since taking office,
President Obama had pushed for an increase in
America’s use of nuclear power to lower the coun-
try’s dependence on fossil fuels (Jones, 2010).
However, the Fukushima disaster emboldened nuclear
critics, led foreign nations to reassess their own
nuclear programmes, and caused US politicians and
citizens to express concern over the safety of nuclear
energy. The disaster in Japan provided fuel for critics’
arguments that flaws in the design of these plants
cannot account for Mother Nature and human fallibil-
ity. Congressman HenryWaxman argued that the crip-
pled Japanese reactors were identical to those used at
16 plants across the United States. When asked if
American nuclear reactors are safe, he stated, ‘No, I
can’t reach that conclusion, nor can anybody at this
point. The industry tells us to relax, we’re okay. I
wouldn’t take anything like that at face value’ (ABC, 16
March). Thus, this frame’s most prominent theme was
not the dangers directly associated with Fukushima’s
crisis, but the potential for a similar event to occur in
the United States.
5.2.2. Calming concerns
The second theme focused on concerns of radiation
reaching the United States. Analysts used nuclear
experts and medical authorities to highlight the pre-
cautions people should and should not take, the
potential health effects of radiation exposure and
issues pertaining to food safety. However, reporters
and their expert guests frequently reassured audi-
ences that there was nothing to worry about. For
example, on 14 March, 3 days into the crisis, CBS had
what they called a ‘reality check’, addressing concerns
surrounding the detection of radiation that had spread
to the United States:
Radiation is all around us, even inside of us, all the
time and it’s perfectly natural and safe.To illustrate
this point, we got hold of this Geiger counter. As
you can see [. . .] there is always background radia-
tion. Check this out. I’m going to put it up against
bananas.You can see it goes up just a little bit. For
the most dramatic reading, here is what happens
when we go up to this monument. It’s made out of
granite. Granite is radioactive but perfectly safe . . .
(CBS, 14 March)
News media also reported that many individuals pur-
chased large quantities of iodine tablets. Experts argued
that iodine pills are meant only for radiation exposure
and are unhealthy if taken without warrant. Reports
concluded that Americans’ money would be better
spent on donations.
5.2.3. Americans abroad
Another theme made salient to American audiences
was the fate of Americans in Japan, both within and
outside the evacuation zone. The United States has
service members stationed at military bases in Japan
and on aircraft carriers off the Japanese shore.There are
also civilianAmericans living, working and vacationing in
Japan. Initially, reporters focused on the US govern-
ment’s urging that allAmericans at least leave the evacu-
ation zone. Later coverage focused on the emotions
associated withAmericans staying behind:‘One husband
is leaving his job early to go back to North Carolina.
Another family, quite poignant, the father staying here to
work, the little boys blowing him kisses’ (ABC, 16
March).
5.3. Heroes and villains
Coverage also characterized the crisis as being caused
and managed by actors who were categorized into two
dichotomous groups based on their perceived compe-
tence and values: heroes and villains.Themes within this
frame emphasized the contrasting protection measures
issued by Japan and the United States, portraying the US
government as protective guardians and the Japanese
government as untrustworthy. Themes also character-
ized workers at the Fukushima power plant as heroes
for staying behind to prevent another meltdown and
TEPCO as villains for not managing the response effec-
tively. Finally, the Japanese people were characterized as
honourable for their ability to retain a shared sense of
sacrifice in the midst of tumult.
5.3.1. America as watchdog and guardian
Stories were often characterized within the context of
how much assistance the United States was providing
to bring the nuclear crisis under control.ABC’s March
18 broadcast, for example, described the US role in
assisting Japan: ‘Tonight the U.S. continues to help the
Japanese try to get power up and running to get the
cooling pumps working again . . . but once power is on,
standing by are five huge high pressure water pumps
from the U.S.’ Coverage portrayed the United States as
fulfilling the role of heroic guardians, especially consid-
ering little attention was paid to the role other nations
played in the crisis response.
News reports also characterized the United States as
possessing a more enlightened perspective on disaster
relief and as having a better grip on the situation than
the Japanese. PBS contrasted the American and Japa-
nese approaches to evacuation: ‘I guess the thing I’m
struck by is the response, the Japanese response against
the American response, the different political styles . . .
our government has probably been a little more accu-
rate from what I can see’. This portrayal of American
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government as more knowledgeable and ‘accurate’ in
terms of appropriate evacuation and containment
measures and regarding the amount and severity of
radiation release was present among the other net-
works as well.
5.3.2. Loss of trust in the Japanese government
US broadcast news was critical of Japanese officials’
management of the crisis. Japanese government was
characterized as initially resistant to accept assistance
from outside nations, as failing to express concern and
provide sufficient information, as underestimating the
severity of the situation, and as neglecting to take
appropriate and timely action. On March 17, Yuki
Tatsumi, a specialist in international politics and secu-
rity, stated on PBS: ‘I don’t think the Japanese govern-
ment has a very good grip on the situation right now,
and I think the fundamental problem about this
current government has been that there has been a
series of questions even before this disaster hit Japan
about their capability for frankly managing crises’. Japa-
nese citizens had also reportedly lost faith in the Japa-
nese government, particularly in their failure to
‘divulge the full extent of what’s happened and what
the danger may be’ (ABC, 12 March). CBS reported
on 16 March that ‘the fallout from Japan’s worst
nuclear accident is growing panic and suspicion that
the government and TEPCO . . . are not telling the
whole truth’.
5.3.3. Heroic workers
Another prominent theme emphasized the heroism of,
complications faced by, and tactics employed by
Fukushima workers to prevent further meltdown. On
24 March, US networks reported that three workers
were exposed to radiation when radioactive water
seeped into their boots and severely burned their skin.
Although the workers were expected to heal, network
news used the incident to demonstrate the danger of
the workers’ heroic efforts in staying behind to manage
the crisis despite many significant complications.
TEPCO came under fire for not issuing proper protec-
tive gear because their boots merely came up to
workers’ ankles.
5.3.4. Inept leaders
News broadcasts unleashed considerable criticism of
TEPCO concerning possible oversights in their disaster
preparedness, particularly in regard to faulty equipment
and facility design, neglecting to adhere to safety stand-
ards, previously falsifying safety reports and frequently
mismanaging public relations.TEPCO also issued over-
blown information about the severity of a radiation leak
on 27 March, causing workers to be evacuated from the
Fukushima complex. Nuclear experts perceived the
receipt of unreliable and inconsistent information as
‘inhibiting an effective crisis response’ (CBS, 16 March).
NBC characterized TEPCO’s mismanagement of this
situation as providing additional evidence that the
overall crisis had been mishandled in terms of both
prevention and response: ‘It was the second apology in
as many days, and just the most recent example of late
or flat out erroneous information coming from the
owners of Japan’s stricken nuclear power plant’.
5.3.5. Resiliency of the Japanese people
Like the selflessness and heroism associated with the
Fukushima workers, the Japanese population was char-
acterized by US network news as displaying a uniquely
brave and stoic response to an unthinkable sequence of
disasters. NBC interviewed a patron at a Tokyo market
on March 20 who felt she had a duty to purchase food
that tested positive for radiation ‘to help farmers’. On
April 5, CBS spoke with a woman who was willing to
sacrifice fresh fish because ‘we can always eat dried
ones that were caught last year’. On 17 March, ABC
reported that doctors and nurses remained behind to
care for elderly residents at a nursing home 15 miles
from the crippled nuclear plant after evacuation teams
refused to remove them.The cultural collectivism was
often characterized in US network news as a uniquely
Japanese sense of shared sacrifice. On 17 March, NBC
interviewed patrons at a restaurant who were out of
fuel, trapped if radiation were to blow through the area:
‘There’s no complaining though. Instead just a quiet
determination’.
5.4. Cancer and contamination
An emphasis on health concerns for Japanese citizens
also emerged consistently across the coverage. This
frame included themes on Japanese (1) vulnerable
populations; (2) food and water safety; and (3) ‘back-
ground’ radiation.
5.4.1. Vulnerable populations
Health-related broadcasts focused primarily on the risk
of cancer for vulnerable populations such as young
children and infants. US networks provided explana-
tions for why children are particularly susceptible to
thyroid damage from radiation. Those who lived and
worked in the evacuation zone were identified as the
most vulnerable. Several nuclear experts noted that the
radiation levels absorbed by Fukushima workers could
be lethal over a short period of time, in some cases
after 30 days of continuous exposure. An expert on
radiological research stated on PBS on March 28 that he
was ‘very concerned about the long-term issues for the
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radiation workers. I think we could be looking at some
serious injuries’.
5.4.2. Food and water safety
Concern for contaminated food emerged during the
second week of the Fukushima crisis, around 19 March,
when traces of radiation appeared in Japanese milk and
leafy vegetables 90 miles from the damaged reactors.
On March 21, elevated levels of radioactive iodine and
cesium were reported in Tokyo’s tap water, measuring
at twice the level considered safe for children and
infants. CBS reported on 23 March that Japanese
officials provided 250,000 bottles of water to families of
the 80,000 infants under age 1 in Tokyo. Even after the
regional governor declared Tokyo’s tap water ‘delicious
and safe for all’ on 24 March, US network news cover-
age portrayed most Japanese mothers as sceptical: ‘Ten
or 20 years down the road, what’s going to happen to
me and my baby?’ (NBC, 24 March).
Much of the coverage asserted that there was a
difference between detection of radiation and actual
danger. Despite these reassurances, Japanese farmers,
restaurants and food vendors experienced a dramatic
drop in business almost immediately after initial detec-
tion. At least 25 countries restricted imports of Japa-
nese milk and produce. Network news coverage
suggested that attempts to convince customers that not
everything grown near the Fukushima plant was radio-
active were futile.
5.4.3. Background radiation
Also salient in broadcasts was the act of screening areas
surrounding the Fukushima complex for radiation con-
tamination. In the first week of the crisis, broadcasts
frequently alluded to the presence of Geiger counters,
handheld scanners and head-to-toe protective radiation
suits used by radiation experts to screen tens of thou-
sands of citizens for the presence of contamination,
particularly those evacuated from the containment
zone or nearby when the building housing one of the
troubled reactors exploded. On 6 April,ABC reported
that, among schoolchildren at the start of the new
academic year, ‘Geiger counters were almost as
common as lunch boxes’.
For the most part, however, detected radiation levels
were not characterized as harmful to the short-term
health of general populations. Four days after workers
at the Fukushima plant were forced to vent radioactive
vapour to prevent a reactor meltdown, CBS reported
that individuals just outside the containment zone
would not even receive doses comparable with a chest
x-ray. Radiation was often detected at ‘background
levels’ in major Japanese cities, particularly Tokyo,
meaning that the presence of nuclear contamination
was elevated, but not high enough to pose a health
threat.
Fundamentally, US network evening news coverage
characterized the events associated with the 2011
Japanese nuclear crisis through four core frames:
(1) uncertainty and anxiety, which characterized the
nuclear incident itself as unpredictable, portrayed
the desperation of response efforts, contextualized the
crisis by comparing it with past nuclear disasters,
and described feelings of isolation in the containment
zone; (2) bringing it home, which localized coverage to
characterize the crisis as having the potential to affect
the United States by discussing the future of US
nuclear power, quelling concerns of radiation dangers,
and issuing sympathy for American citizens in Japan;
(3) heroes and villains, which dichotomized the com-
petence and values of US and Japanese management
strategies, analysed the efforts of ‘heroic’ workers to
prevent further meltdown, placed blame on the ‘villain-
ous’ TEPCO, and honoured the stoic resilience of the
Japanese people; and (4) cancer and contamination,
which identified Japan’s vulnerable populations and
specific health risks, discussed food and water safety,
and included coverage on screening practices and
detection of radiation.
6. Discussion and implications
The media coverage of the Fukushima disaster and its
crisis response could have been categorized into envi-
ronment, human interest, political, economic, and, to a
lesser extent, criminal frames (Houston et al., 2012).
Stories were also framed to question attribution of
responsibility, conflict and morality in the crisis
response (An & Gower, 2009). However, to describe
the Fukushima disaster according to these broad frames
alone does not help to contextualize subsequent shifts
in public opinion and policy within the larger issue
culture that shapes and reflects ongoing media dis-
course related to nuclear power (Gamson & Modigliani,
1989). In other words, studying the ways in which news
frame crises can provide a context by which to under-
stand shifts in public opinion and policy. Previous
research has shown that the media’s ability to frame the
crisis, its causes, and those responsible for its manage-
ment can influence how audiences interpret and
respond to these events (Entman, 1993; Ryan et al.,
2001; Van Gorp, 2007; ). In the following discussion, we
examine the specific frames that characterized US
evening news coverage of the Fukushima disaster to
assess how this coverage reflected and contributed to
existing media discourse about nuclear issues (Gamson
& Modigliani, 1989) and outline implications for framing
theory and crisis management research and practice.
Recent discussions of the crisis at Fukushima that found
themes consistent with those that emerged in our
analysis are included (Aldrich, 2012; Blankson, Nastasia,
& Liu, 2012).
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First, the localizing of coverage reflected existing, and
possibly influenced additional, questions regarding the
future of US nuclear power. Because foreign crises are
not directly experienced by viewers overseas, interna-
tional stories are often framed for a domestic audience
‘by casting far-away events in frameworks that render
these events comprehensible’ (Gurevitch, Levy, & Roeh,
1991, 206).The most common theme within the locali-
zation frame focused on the safety of the 104 nuclear
reactors in the US media reports questioning whether
a crisis similar to Fukushima could occur in the United
States spurred nuclear critics and temporarily silenced
supporters of President Obama’s February 2010
proposal to increase federal loan guarantees by $36
billion to encourage the start-up of nuclear power
plants and launch a ‘nuclear renaissance’ (Shear &
Mufson, 2010; Schlesinger, 2011).While Obama contin-
ued to support the proposal, Congress cited constitu-
ent concerns for nuclear safety.The Chairman of the US
Nuclear Regulatory Commission argued that ‘There is
still more work to be done to ensure that lessons
learned from [Fukushima] are engrained in the reactor
design [. . .] I cannot support this licensing as if
Fukushima never happened’ (MSNBC, 2012: paragraph
3). In February 2014, theWhite House moved forward
with plans to build the first reactors in the United
States in nearly 30 years. Environmental groups criti-
cized the decision, citing the upcoming third-year anni-
versary of the events at Fukushima as evidence that
nuclear reactors can never be safe. However, the
Obama administration argued that nuclear power was
necessary to combat climate change (Geewax, 2014).
We suggest that how the media framed the crisis
reflected ongoing discourse related to nuclear power
and helped to provide additional interpretations for
relevant nuclear events that were influential in delaying
the still-controversial nuclear renaissance. The media
became the primary arena for the frame competition
that occurred within stories as the Fukushima disaster
‘stimulated public debate’ over nuclear energy policies
in the United States and in other industrialized nations
(Sellnow & Seeger, 2013, 8). Network news coverage of
Fukushima lacked clear progress frames characterizing
the domestic necessity of nuclear power in the month
following the crisis. Instead, the runaway potential of
nuclear technology to cause similar incidents in the
United States was heavily emphasized. Therefore, as
media attention towards nuclear issues intensified in
the month following the Fukushima crisis, we speculate
that audiences’ existing fatalism and ambivalence
towards nuclear power dipped into opposition, which
influenced and reflected the larger issue culture that
led to the delayed nuclear renaissance. However, even
following destabilizing crises, policy reforms in pluralis-
tic nations typically end up being minor or incremental
in nature (Boin et al., 2009). Historically, audience
opposition towards nuclear development has reverted
back to its original ambivalence as media attention
towards nuclear issues fades (Gamson & Modigliani,
1989).This lack of continued media attention paved the
way for the reintroduction of government progress
frames emphasizing the environmental necessity of
nuclear development in the United States. As anti-
nuclear advocates cited the crisis at Fukushima to
emphasize the runaway nature of nuclear power, devil’s
bargain frames characterizing resignation to the inevi-
table danger of nuclear development have become
more prominent in recent news discourse (e.g.,
Walsh, 2014).Therefore, the existing issue culture that
first prevented and has now enabled the resurgence of
the nuclear renaissance was likely shaped by and
reflected in this shifting media discourse (Gamson &
Modigliani, 1989).
Second, US network news presented conflicting
themes characterizing radiation fears, which not only
reflected anxiety about the runaway nature of nuclear
power that already existed in the larger issue culture,
but also created and failed to reduce additional uncer-
tainty that became legitimized in the global market-
place. During Fukushima, worldwide media exposure
helped keep the rest of the world informed, engaged,
and aware of the complex and rapidly evolving crisis
(Blankson et al., 2012). This coverage also served as a
focal point for many industrialized nations to reassess
their own commitments to nuclear power (Aldrich,
2012). As foreboding images of explosions releasing
plumes of radiation, scores of Geiger counters and
radiation suits, and empty Japanese neighbourhoods
were disseminated in the immediate aftermath of the
crisis, news coverage likely tapped into the existing
public fear regarding the runaway nature of nuclear
energy. Because public and media discourse interact
with one another as parallel systems (Gamson &
Modigliani, 1989), subsequent coverage characterized
the emotional toll of the crisis by including themes
about the anxiety and fear felt by Japanese and Ameri-
can citizens. Stories included the increased purchasing
of iodine tablets in the United States, the decrease in
foreign imports from Japan, and Japanese citizens aban-
doning domestic food products. However, the media
also frequently attempted to quash concerns regarding
the spread of dangerous radiation from Fukushima. For
example, ‘reality checks’ on background radiation were
used to compare trace amounts of contaminant
detected in America and even Tokyo to radiation in a
microwave or banana. Nevertheless, conflicting themes
within stories both characterized and attempted to
dispel public fear. Because these fears were felt in the
global marketplace for an extended period of time, this
coverage did not reduce the audience’s uncertainty of
the crisis to a sufficient degree. Just as disaster coverage
influences public perception of the world as more crisis
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prone (James, 2008), the media’s inability to dissuade
myths concerning disaster behaviour can influence
organizational, governmental and public responses to
calamity (Tierney, Bevc, & Kuligowski, 2006). A lesson
learned from the coverage of the Fukushima disaster is
that, regardless of the media’s safety assurances, corpo-
rations and nations with the means and policy flexibility
to reduce reliance on a potentially dangerous source
will pursue other options when fear themes are also
present within frames.
Third, our analysis revealed that themes of the
fluctuating crisis events changed substantially as the
situation unfolded. For example, almost as quickly
the situation seemed to be under control, new
complications of the crisis would consistently arise.This
oscillation contributed to the fundamental runaway
characterization of the crisis events at Fukushima as
unpredictable, constantly changing, nightmarish and des-
perate. Journalists and crisis actors were on pins and
needles, resigned to an out-of-control technology that
betrayed its creators, a time bomb that could explode
at any moment and release harmful radiation that could
cause invisible and delayed health effects. However, in
addition to the rapid evolution of the situation, the
uncertainty reduction needed for crisis managers in the
early stages of the crisis was lacking (Li, 2007). Frame
conflicts regarding the severity of the event were appar-
ent within stories as US news frequently used US gov-
ernment and international nuclear experts to undercut
information fromTEPCO and the Japanese government,
who lost credibility as crisis managers due to their lack
of transparency and unwillingness to involve the inter-
national community (Buus et al., 2006).Thus, the media
could not fulfill their uncertainty reduction duties in the
immediate stages of the crisis due in part to Japan’s
poor crisis response.
A lack of collaboration between emergency officials
in Japan and the US media could have also contributed
to a lack of uncertainty reduction (Veil, 2012). Much of
the coverage failed to include experts and officials from
Japan. In fact, PBS was the only station that consistently
included Japanese sources as experts and not only
affected citizens.As Cohen et al. (2008) explained,when
‘expert’ voices are marginalized by journalists who
emphasize the role of lay parties, the dissemination of
accurate information about the scientific and technical
aspects of crises often does not occur. In this case, US
experts were able to provide insight into the scientific
and technical aspects of the crisis, and they did so in
great detail, often including complicated computer
models of the reactors. However, these experts could
only speculate on what was happening inside Fukushima
and the implications of the recovery efforts, and that
speculation was based on fairly subjective interpreta-
tions of science. Different experts also interpreted the
situation differently and had contradictory opinions
about what could happen. So, while there was not a
dearth of scientific and technical information, rather
than reducing uncertainty, journalistic source selection
and the complicated and sometimes contradictory
information presented actually hindered sensemaking
and added to public confusion.
Finally, the media shape and reflect how the public
perceives the effectiveness of crisis management strat-
egies (Zoeteman et al., 2010). Public accountability
frames were used by US news to characterize TEPCO
and government officials as failing to take the proper
safety precautions necessary to prevent and manage the
crisis; neglecting to issue clear and timely information to
Japanese citizens, officials and international nuclear
crisis actors; ignoring offers of international assistance;
and as being largely responsible for rising citizen dis-
trust, anger, and activism and the possible overreactions
of foreign governments in their management of the
crisis. While Japanese officials used the media to
describe the efforts they were taking to protect citizens
from the risks of radiation, and TEPCO recapped the
organization’s past and future contributions to commu-
nities (Blankson et al., 2012), competing frames were
issued by critics. Oppositional forces exploited the
crisis as a critical opportunity to expose the deficien-
cies of nuclear development as a whole and to advocate
for reform or removal of dysfunctional nuclear policies,
leaders and organizational behaviours in Japan.Addition-
ally, because of the perception that TEPCO and the
Japanese government failed to prevent a controllable
crisis and execute an effective disaster response, the
level of focused blame issued by critics in the media was
maximized (Boin et al., 2009).The history of cover-ups
at TEPCO and longstanding government acquiescence
to the nuclear industry in Japan also prevented the crisis
actors from deploying any pre-existing credibility to
disprove rumours and outrage (Zoeteman et al., 2010).
Although TEPCO and the Japanese government issued
multiple apologies throughout the crisis, blame levels
can rise even further in the media when crisis actors
under direct blame assume responsibility for their
transgressions (Resodihardjo, van Eijk, & Carroll, 2012).
Additionally, the frequent safety assurances and less
conservative evacuation zones issued by Japanese offi-
cials compared withAmerican officials in the initial days
appeared to raise suspicion among the news media.
When authorities take an overly calming perspective
and do not acknowledge which uncertainties exist, com-
peting risk frames could be amplified (Zoeteman et al.,
2010).
We argue that the vilification of TEPCO and the
Japanese government was based on culturally discrep-
ant news framing (Feng et al., 2012). Like the US media,
the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investi-
gation, commissioned by the Japanese parliament,
declared the disaster ‘man-made’ and outlined ‘errors
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and willful negligence . . . and a flawed response’ by
TEPCO and the Japanese government (Wakatsuki &
Mullen, 2012: paragraphs 1–2). However, the commis-
sion also cited the Japanese collectivist culture and
‘reluctance to question authority’ as an underlying
cause of the crisis (Tabuchi, 2012: paragraph 16). Indi-
vidual culprits were not named because the commission
determined the same crisis could have happened with
different individuals in the same positions because of
the Japanese culture. The primary focus of the report
was on instructive findings and recommendations for
the future of nuclear energy in Japan. And, despite the
intensely critical coverage of TEPCO and the Japanese
government, Japan has recently proposed reopening the
country’s nuclear plants (Walsh, 2014).The resilience of
nuclear energy in Japan aligns with the resilience of the
Japanese people following the disaster. The Japanese
emphasis on collectivism, high power distance and
group solidarity may have encouraged news coverage in
Japan to be less critical to avoid disturbing the harmony
and interests of their society (Blankson et al., 2012).The
culture supports a collective move forward.
Conversely, in the frame competition between US
and Japanese crisis response perspectives, network
news coverage perpetuated the general mythos of the
United States as a benevolent hero and all-knowing
watchdog who comes to the aid of needy others.
Hook and Pu (2006, 178) argued that ‘the roots of
media framing lie deeper than government regime type
and extend to cultural schemas and social identities’.
The frames that the US government and media con-
structed to describe Japan reflected the nature of the
relationship between the nations as it has evolved
since World War II (Lim et al., 2009). News frames
employ larger cultural themes to make coverage
appear more natural and familiar to domestic audi-
ences (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Since 9/11,
America has assumed a specific, postmodern national
identity that ‘establishes its own moral virtue through
victimization and heroic restitution’ (Anker, 2005, 25).
US network news portrayed America as unified and
virtuous in their response to the nuclear crisis as well
as possessing better information, better strategies, and
a more open and honest approach than the Japanese
government agencies and engineers. Just as US citizens
can go online to watch the news on Al Jazeera and the
BBC, so too can individuals in other countries inter-
ested in US news coverage.There is a reason why the
United States maintains a reputation as ‘Arrogant
Americans’. The stereotype is perpetuated on the
evening news.
According to Anderson (1992, p. 356), ‘The human
condition is lived in the semiotic frames that we, the
collective, build and support’.The frames presented by
the US network news questioned the safety of US
nuclear power in the midst of Japan’s nuclear crisis and
attempted to quell domestic radiation fears while simul-
taneously presenting the US nuclear industry and gov-
ernment as more intelligent and honest than the
Japanese industry and government.We contend that the
reality constructed by these interpretations reflects and
influences how audiences understand US policies on
nuclear power and Japan’s ability to recover from the
crisis. Our findings also demonstrate how audience
perceptions of health risks can endure and influence
behaviour, despite the media’s attempts to debunk panic
myths.This study took a much-needed step beyond the
simple identification and quantification of media frames
to examine how news framing of international events
can help us understand the shift in US public opinion
and policy within the context of ongoing US media
discourse related to nuclear power. Future research
may expand these findings by studying additional inter-
national news sources, such as Japanese news broad-
casts, in order to compare the international
characterizations of the nuclear crisis with the results
of our study.
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